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OED Mission: Enhancing development effectiveness through excellence and independence in evaluation. 
 
About this Report 
The Operations Evaluation Department assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to 
ensure the integrity of the Bank’s self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank’s work is producing the expected results, 
and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from 
experience. As part of this work, OED annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank’s lending operations. In selecting 
operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to 
upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested 
assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons. The projects, topics, and analytical approaches selected 
for assessment support larger evaluation studies. 
A Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) is based on a review of the Implementation Completion Report (a 
self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department) and fieldwork conducted by OED. To prepare PPARs, OED staff 
examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, and in most cases visit the borrowing country for 
onsite discussions with project staff and beneficiaries. The PPAR thereby seeks to validate and augment the information 
provided in the ICR, as well as examine issues of special interest to broader OED studies.  
Each PPAR is subject to a peer review process and OED management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is 
reviewed by the responsible Bank department and amended as necessary. The completed PPAR is then sent to the 
borrower for review; the borrowers’ comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank’s Board of Executive 
Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public. 
 
About the OED Rating System 
The time-tested evaluation methods used by OED are suited to the broad range of the World Bank’s work. The 
methods offer both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral 
approach. OED evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and 
rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (more information is available on the OED website: 
http://worldbank.org/oed/eta-mainpage.html). 
Relevance of Objectives: The extent to which the project’s objectives are consistent with the country’s current 
development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). Possible 
ratings: High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. 
Efficacy: The extent to which the project’s objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account 
their relative importance. Possible ratings: High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. 
Efficiency: The extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity 
cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. Possible ratings: High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. 
This rating is not generally applied to adjustment operations. 
Sustainability: The resilience to risk of net benefits flows over time. Possible ratings: Highly Likely, Likely, Unlikely, 
Highly Unlikely, Not Evaluable. 
Institutional Development Impact: The extent to which a project improves the ability of a country or region to make 
more efficient, equitable and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources through: (a) better definition, 
stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the 
mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. Institutional 
Development Impact includes both intended and unintended effects of a project. Possible ratings: High, Substantial, Modest, 
Negligible.  
Outcome: The extent to which the project’s major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, 
efficiently. Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, 
Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory. 
Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry and supported 
implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation 
of the project). Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory. 
Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and responsibility to ensure quality of 
preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development 
objectives and sustainability. Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.  
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Preface 
This is a Project Performance Audit Report (PPAR) for two projects in Croatia. The 
Highway Sector Project (Loan 3869-CR) was approved for a loan of US$80 million equivalent 
on April 20, 1995, and closed on June 30, 2001, six months behind schedule. An undisbursed 
amount of US$0.1 million was cancelled. The Emergency Transport and Mine Clearing Project 
(Loan 4104-CR) was approved for a loan of US$102 million equivalent on November 21, 1996, 
and closed on December 31, 2001, 18 months behind schedule. The loan was fully disbursed.  
This report is based on reviews of the Implementation Completion Report (ICR), the 
Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), loan documents, project files, transcripts of Board proceedings, 
and other Bank documents, and on discussions with Bank staff. An OED mission visited Croatia 
in May 2003 and reviewed the projects with officials responsible for the transport sector and for 
clearing of landmines. Their kind assistance is gratefully acknowledged. 
The PPAR was undertaken in support of an OED Country Assistance Evaluation for 
Croatia. The PPAR gives special attention to the allocation of resources and funding for 
maintenance in the highway sector project and to the impact, both domestically and 
internationally, of reestablishing physical links through the emergency transport and mine 
clearing project. 
Following standard procedures, copies of the PPAR was sent to the Croatian authorities 
for comments but none were received. 
 

ix 
Summary 
The Highway Sector Project, approved in 1995, aimed to support and speed up the 
modernization and transformation of the highway system in Croatia with special emphasis on the 
main road network and Croatian Road Authority (HC). The project’s main component financed 
three years of the HC’s investment program. The project also involved road safety, vehicle 
emissions, and technical assistance to prepare  the restructuring of Croatian Railways and a 
Master Plan for Rijeka, Croatia’s main seaport. A key aspect of the project was its sectoral 
approach to Croatia’s road system. 
The Emergency Transport and Mine Clearing Project, approved in 1996, covered the 
first phase of a larger reconstruction program following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, 
ensuing hostilities, and the subsequent Dayton peace agreement (signed in December 1995). The 
project objectives were to (i) repair and reconstruct the surface transport networks within 
Croatia, especially those leading to  Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and (ii) clear landmines 
specifically in areas of high economic priority for reconstruction, starting with the transport 
networks. While the transport component was straightforward with established agencies,  mine 
clearing was complex because no established organization existed to handle the work in a 
civilian reconstruction context. 
In the Highway project, physical implementation of the road works was conducted largely as 
expected — some 1,600 kilometers of roads, two-thirds of the original target, were rehabilitated and 
45 kilometers of trunk and primary roads were built, meeting targets. The other activities, technical 
assistances, studies and training, were also carried out as intended. Despite this, the project’s outcome 
is rated unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, because the government launched an additional, large 
motorway program in 1998. The program largely consisted of uneconomic investments with low 
economic returns. Second, because the overall condition of Croatia’s road network improved only 
marginally or was worse at the end of the project than at the beginning, mainly because of inadequate 
funding for road maintenance. Sustainability is rated likely because the government in 2001 created 
separate agencies for managing the existing road network (Croatian Roads, CR) and for developing 
and managing motorways (Croatian Motorways), each with dedicated, off-budget funding from a 
surcharge on gasoline tax, which appears to be adequate for the maintenance of each of the two 
systems. Furthermore, the motorway construction program has been scaled down considerably. 
Institutional development is rated modest, since the road pavement management system, the 
project’s main institutional component, was still not fully operational by project completion. Bank 
performance is rated satisfactory, since the project was well prepared and supervision was effective, 
and the Bank did its utmost to promote economic efficiency in the road sector, including preparation 
of a high-quality sector paper that analyzed the economic and financial issues posed by the motorway 
program. Borrower performance is rated unsatisfactory due to the double misallocation of 
resources: the large amount of funds for the motorway program and insufficient funding of road 
maintenance. On the other hand, implementation performance by the road agency was generally very 
good. 
 
x 
In the Emergency Transport and Mine Clearing project, about 13 square kilometers were 
cleared, and about 1,500 landmines and 3,200 pieces of unexploded ordinance were removed to 
enable infrastructure work to go ahead. Repair or reconstruction of transport infrastructure, made 
possible by this, either met or exceeded targets and included 180 kilometers of roads, 32 bridges, 
reconstruction of two railway lines (Lika and Novska-Sisak), and piers, terminals, and equipment 
in the Port of Ploce. Outcome is rated satisfactory. The project was instrumental in 
reestablishing physical links between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Making operational 
the 10 bridges connecting the two countries across the Sava and the Uma rivers dramatically 
improved  the prospects for trade and movement of persons between the two countries. The 
reconstruction and improvement of Ploce port, BiH’s main maritime outlet, also is a major 
contributor to improving BiH logistical conditions, although port activity has not yet reached the 
expected levels mainly due to the slow recovery of BiH’s economy. The project also improved 
important sections of Croatia’s domestic land transport system. Sustainability is rated likely: 
clearance of mines has permanently freed key areas for reconstruction,  funding for road 
maintenance is likely to be adequate, and structural reforms of the railway sector are proceeding 
faster than expected. The weak point is the Port of Ploce, where traffic is only gradually picking 
up.  Institutional development is rated substantial, even though it was not a primary focus of this 
emergency operation, on account of (i) the extension of competitive bidding introduced under the 
project for demining to all mine clearing operations and development of a local demining 
industry, and (ii) the creation of CROMAC, the effective national agency in charge of mine 
clearing.  Bank and borrower performance are rated satisfactory. 
The following lessons emerge from these projects: 
¾ Highway ‘sector’ projects need to take a comprehensive view of the sector, and include 
appropriate sector-wide performance indicators. The overall condition of the road 
network is one such key indicator, since it is useful to judge the level of resources 
allocated for maintenance of the network and the efficiency of road maintenance planning 
and operations. Highway agencies should have in place a reliable system to monitor road 
network condition. 
¾ Separation of agencies and funding sources for the maintenance and improvement of the 
national road network and for the construction of modern motorways, as Croatia did in 
2001, can be an effective way to ensure a stable level of funding for road maintenance. 
But stringent operating rules are necessary to ensure that resources are used efficiently, 
especially as regards motorways. 
¾ Bank-financed projects, by requiring competitive procurement and exemplifying its 
advantages, can lead to the establishment of competitive procurement throughout a whole 
industry and to the development of qualified domestic contractors 
¾ The need to improve transparency of its public procurement process is an important issue 
in Croatia’s public policy. 
 
 Gregory K. Ingram 
Director-General 
Operations Evaluation 
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1. Background 
1.1 This PPAR reviews two transport projects that were first Bank operations for Croatia in 
the sector. Each project covered various modes within the transport sector. The Highway Sector 
Project (hereafter the “highway” project), was approved before the Dayton Peace agreements for 
Bosnia Herzegovina (signed on December 14, 1995). It focused on the highway system in the 
territory that was under government control at the time (about two-thirds, the remaining third 
being Protected Areas under the control of the United Nations). The project also supported 
studies related to preparing reforms and investments for Croatia’s railway and for the port of 
Rijeka, Croatia’s main port.  
1.2 The Emergency Transport and Mine Clearing Project (hereafter the “emergency 
transport” project), approved after the Dayton agreements, complemented the highway project in 
two ways: First, it supported improvements of the road network, focusing on road sections that, 
before the peace agreements, were located in conflict areas and therefore not possible to repair. 
Second, it financed repair of key rail lines and reconstruction of the infrastructure in the Port of 
Ploce, Croatia’s second-busiest port, serving especially BiH’s foreign trade. Clearing of 
landmines, covered by project, was designed to permit repair and operation of transport routes. 
The project followed the Emergency Reconstruction project (Loan 3760, for $128 million, 
approved in June 1994 and closed in December 1999). This earlier project also financed some 
transport investments, especially equipment and vehicles for roads and railways, but it focused 
mainly on power, community reconstruction, and water supply.  
1.3 The war following the breakup of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the Republic of 
Croatia cost thousand of lives and caused considerable damage to physical infrastructure, 
schools, hospitals, commercial and public buildings, and housing. Transport infrastructure, 
because of its logistical function during the war, was also hard hit. Practically all bridges along 
the Sava river separating Croatia from Bosnia Herzegovina were destroyed, as were railway lines 
and port facilities serving both countries. 
1.4 During the period since approval of the highway project, and especially after the Dayton 
agreement, Croatia’s economy has made an erratic and rather modest recovery, with average 
annual GDP growth over five percent in 1996-97 and 2002, and below three percent (including 
one negative year) during 1998-2000. GDP per capita PPP was about $8,000 in 2002. The 
restructuring of the economy has reduced the movement of heavy goods and favors road 
transport, and international trade is increasingly oriented toward Western Europe. 
1.5 The Bank’s involvement in Croatia’s transport sector continues at present with two 
projects, both of which had preparation assisted by the projects under review in this PPAR: the 
Railway Modernization and Restructuring project (Loan 4433 for $101 million, approved in 
January 1999 and expected to close in June 2004) and the Rijeka Gateway Project (Loans 
47140/47150/47160/P3910, for $156.5 million, approved in July 2003 and expected to close in 
September 2009). 
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OBJECTIVES BOX 1. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND COMPONENTS 
Highway Sector Project 
 
Objectives 
¾ Support and speed up the modernization of the transport sector, especially the main road 
network and HC, with the following specific objectives: 
• Support government road investment program, address road maintenance and construction of a 
few, well-justified road sections 
• Develop modern management tools 
• Improve road safety 
• Decrease road vehicle emissions 
• Maintain or increase road user charges 
• Support restructuring of railway company and reduce subsidies 
• Contribute to preparation of master investment plan for Rijeka port 
 
Components  
• Three-year slice (1995-97) of road expenditure program (repair war-damaged roads, road maintenance, 
and completion of selected sections) and provision of maintenance equipment 
• Technical assistance and studies (rail restructuring, traffic safety, pavement management, Rijeka port 
plan) 
• Training of highway agency staff 
 
 
Emergency Transport and Mine Clearing Project 
Objectives 
• Repair and reconstruct surface transport networks within Croatia, especially those leading to BiH1 
• Clear landmines in areas of high economic priority for reconstruction 
 
Components 
• Roads and bridges 
¾ Zupanja-Orasje bridge 
¾ 130 kilometers of roads 
¾ About 30 bridges 
¾ Upgraded access to Ploce port 
• Railways 
¾ Reconstruction of Lika line (45 kilometers of track and related equipment) 
¾ Reconstruction of two bridges on Novska-Sisak line 
• Ploce Port 
¾ Reconstruction of two piers 
¾ Repair of other infrastructure and equipment, and provision of container handling equipment 
• Mine clearing, with first priority to project areas 
 
 
                                                 
1. The SAR formulation says...”within Croatia and between Croatia and BiH”, which is less clear. 
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2. Relevance and Design 
Highway Sector  
2.1 The project’s main goal, to support modernization and transformation of Croatia’s 
transport system, with special emphasis on the road network, supported the objectives of the 
1995 Country Assistance Strategy, especially related to improving efficiency of the public sector. 
During the war, road and other infrastructure had been seriously damaged and maintenance 
neglected, and the transition economy was bound to place increasing reliance on the road as the 
predominant transport mode. 
2.2 With its main focus on supporting the 1995–97 road expenditure program, the project 
was rightly designed as a sector operation, with components and levels of expenditures 
considered as tentative and subject to review annually with the Bank. The design decision was 
based on the importance of supporting the government’s road program, Croatia’s long 
experience with Bank highway projects as part of the former Yugoslav Republic,2 and the strong 
technical capabilities of Croatia’s highway management and technical staff. 
2.3 The project emphasized the maintenance of existing assets, given the adequate length of 
the country’s road network, but its poor and deteriorating condition. The appraisal documents 
noted that under the 1995–97 program, road maintenance expenditures were expected to increase 
by some 90 percent per year of the program relative to the previous four years. As a sectoral 
project, concerned with the whole road network rather than individual road investments, the 
project was right in taking a comprehensive view of road system expenditures. At the same time, 
in view of the project’s emphasis on maintenance, it would have been useful to include in the 
appraisal report a performance indicator describing the condition of the overall road network and 
targets for improvement that the intended modernization of the road network would bring about. 
Such indicator would also have served to assess the adequacy of road maintenance funding. 
2.4 Legal agreements under the project aimed to ensure that investments during the period 
would reflect the maintenance focus of the 1995–97 program, and to prevent uneconomic 
investments. New road construction was expected to be limited to the completion of works 
underway. 
2.5 In hindsight, the government, in its 1995–97 road plan, and the project, in consequence, 
could have recognized the foreseeable changes in transport demand patterns, for trade and 
tourism, away from Belgrade-centric flows of FSRY, a greater role for road transport, and 
changes in the relative importance of various routes and itineraries. A question then would have 
been how to attend to the new demand patterns, in a way consistent with available resources and 
economic efficiency. 
2.6 The project objective to ensure that the level of road user charges would be maintained or 
increased (and the associated conditionality regarding the level of the road vehicle fuel tax) had 
no value from either an economic or a financial standpoint, and therefore was unnecessary-it 
only served to clutter the already long list of objectives. On the economic side, revenues from 
road users stemming from the fuel tax were double what was needed for the road sector, and thus 
could be considered to cover the economic cost of road use. Appraisal documentation provided 
 
2. HC had been the implementing agency in 12 Bank highway projects for the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. 
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no suggestion that the government might have intended to decrease the level of user charges. On 
the financial side, fuel tax revenues were collected by the central government but were not 
dedicated for road maintenance; therefore maintaining the level of user charges provided no 
comfort that adequate funding for road maintenance would be provided. 
Emergency Transport  
2.7 Rebuilding Croatia’s economic infrastructure, some of which was inoperative because it 
had been damaged during the war, or because it was unsafe due to landmines or unexploded 
ordnance, or both, was clearly a priority. For infrastructure that was mined, clearing the mines 
was an obvious first step in reconstruction. At the same time, giving priority to repairing links 
within Croatia that connected with BiH routes were of importance to BiH and supported the 
Dayton peace agreements. The transport sector was an obvious candidate for the Bank because 
key, but not all, necessary agreements between Croatia and BiH had been signed, a joint 
implementation committee had been established, and implementation work had begun.3  
2.8 The preparation of the mine clearing component was expected to benefit from the 
experience with the processing a few months earlier of a land mine clearing project in BiH 
(approved in July 1996, or four months before the Emergency Transport project) especially 
through Bank procurement guidelines developed for the project. The Croatia project provided a 
stronger requirement for competition in procurement, since it required use of international 
competitive bidding for all works and goods contracts over $2 million, rather than $5 million, as 
in the Bosnian program.4 Yet, as noted in a parallel PPAR of the BiH project, preparation of the 
BiH project left much to be desired, and serious problems of misprocurement arose during its 
implementation. Overall, the BiH demining project failed to achieve its objectives, that were 
much broader than those for the Croatia operation. 
2.9 The PPAR for the Emergency Reconstruction project raised doubts about the designation 
of “emergency” given that project, considering that it became effective in August 1994, more 
than two and half years after the ending of the 1991–92 hostilities. While the Emergency 
Transport project was approved more than two years later than the Emergency Reconstruction 
project, the fact that it focused on the reconstruction of infrastructure in areas that were not in 
full government control prior to the signing of the Dayton agreement makes it a legitimate 
emergency project under Bank guidelines for Emergency Recovery Projects (OP8.50), which 
specifically include reconstruction following war. As noted in the MOP for the Emergency 
Transport project, the Government’s control over all the areas within internationally recognized 
borders was implemented over several phases. It was only in May and August 1995 that the 
Government regained control of three out of four areas that had so far been in the United Nations 
Protected Areas (UNPA); the fourth area in November 1995 was placed under a United Nations 
transitional administration. The four areas amounted to about one-third of the country. Prior to 
1995, reconstruction of infrastructure had been limited to areas directly under Government 
control or in locations sufficiently distant from front lines to justify investments. 
 
3. The Dayton Agreements, in Annex 9, establish Bosnia and Herzegovina Transportation Corporation to “organize and operate 
transportation facilities, such as roads, railways and ports.” 
4. According to ETMC project appraisal documentation. 
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2.10 The project was processed as an emergency operation (for example, with a Memorandum 
of the President instead of a full Staff Appraisal Report)5. However, total processing time of 15 
months from initial identification (November 1995) to project effectiveness (March 1997) was 
overly long, thus negating the benefits of speedier processing allowed by emergency operations. 
Confusion about the project designation as an ERL arose because the project is wrongly 
classified in the Bank’s Legal database as a Specific Investment Loan (SIL). 
2.11 Processed as an emergency operation, no economic analysis of the project-financed 
investments was carried out. This approach is allowed under BP8.50 when essential data cannot 
be obtained within a reasonable period. This PPAR finds that an effort should have been made, 
even with sketchy data, to carry out economic analysis, at least for the transport investments, 
which accounted for 72 percent of total project costs.  Such investments, consisting mainly of 
spot or short section repairs allowing larger components of the transport network to operate 
correctly, would normally yield high economic returns.  
3. Implementation 
3.1 Readiness. The highway project was ready for implementation and procurement started 
on schedule. However, a review by the PPAR of the list of contracts for road works found some 
significant variance between base contract and invoiced values (several subprojects ended up 
costing 50 percent and up to 100 percent more than the initial contract), suggesting that 
significant changes in scope took place in those subprojects, probably because of inadequate 
engineering at the outset or due to upgrading design standards after the contracts had been 
signed. 
3.2 Implementation of the emergency transport project was substantially slower than 
expected. Delays at the start of the project in programming the clearing of land mines were 
substantial, mainly as a result of weak coordination and lax identification of priorities on the 
transport side. At the same time, there was little institutional capacity to prepare bid documents 
(including description of the sites to be demined) since mine clearing in Croatia traditionally had 
been done by the army. A few months before project approval the government created a state 
mine clearing company (MUNGOS) to take over this responsibility. Therefore, there was no 
experience in Croatia with mine clearing by civilian contractors, the same constraint identified in 
BiH by OED’s parallel PPAR of the Emergency Landmines Clearance Project (Credit 2905) 
there. This is a recurrent issue in emergency projects, where the need to make repairs urgently 
conflicts with inadequate data and weak institutional capacities.  
3.3 Costs. In the highway project, which had a sector-wide approach, actual cost of the 
overall road program, due to new road construction, especially the inclusion of a new motorway 
program not originally foreseen, was US$1.6 billion, almost three times the SAR estimate. In the 
emergency transport project, actual project cost was $131.2 million, 7 percent higher than 
expected, mainly because some 40 percent more kilometers of roads were rehabilitated than 
originally estimated. Actual costs were divided 75 percent for transport and 25 percent for 
demining, in line with SAR estimates. In the highway sector project, contract prices were, on 
average, 15 percent lower than appraisal estimates. However, as noted above, final prices turned 
 
5. During early preparation, the project initially intended to cover restoration of public services in several sectors, and was not 
originally conceived as an ERL. However, internal Bank discussion during preparation suggested that it should be a much more 
focused operation, and for the sake of speed that the project should be processed as an ERL. As required by OP8.50, an Ad Hoc 
Advisory Committee was established early on. 
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out to be substantially higher. In the transport project, the cost of demining dropped from 18 
HRK (US$2.92) per square meter at the start of the project to 11 HRK (US$1.32) (including 
insurance) in 2001.6 Increased competition and lower unit costs also were aided by the return to 
civilian rule, and the more stable conditions obtained after the signing of the peace agreements. 
3.4 Institutional changes during implementation. The highway sector project was affected by 
erratic provision of funding for maintenance and by reforms to the highway agency. The reform 
was positive for the management of the road sector, especially as it reclassified and decentralized 
the road network. When the project was practically completed, another reform created a new 
highway agency with autonomous financing based on dedicated user charges. However, 
uncertainties during preparation of the reform and adapting to the new structure affected project 
implementation, especially the design and implementation of the pavement management system. 
3.5 The emergency transport project was similarly affected. First was the transfer of 
demining responsibility from the army to the newly created MUNGOS, under the Ministry of 
Interior (MI), which happened just before the start of the project. PPAR discussions in the field 
found that MUNGOS officials initially believed that Bank funding would directly support 
MUNGOS demining activities. Second, a year into implementation, the MI transferred this 
responsibility to the newly created Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC), a government 
agency set up to manage the demining process through contracts awarded after competitive 
bidding.  This required (i) early during implementation, clarifying with MUNGOS and other 
government officials the project’s procurement rules and (b) a number of time-consuming 
legislative changes to eliminate restrictions to international competitive bidding. 
3.6 Implementation of the emergency transport project was, as noted in the implementation 
completion report, also delayed because of complaints by unsuccessful bidders for landmine 
clearing contracts. This same issue was noted in the emergency reconstruction project.7 This 
suggests that transparency needs to be improved in the procurement process. 
4. Outcome 
Highway Sector  
Output 
4.1 Road investments. The project financed maintenance, strengthening, and rehabilitation of 
some 1,600 kilometers, or about 20 percent of the main road network. This represents about 67 
percent of the total output (2,387 kilometers) expected at appraisal.8 The project also financed 
construction of about 28 kilometers of trunk roads and about 17 kilometers of primary roads, 
meeting appraisal targets. In addition, dangerous road sections were eliminated. 
 
6. The reduction was much more and final unit costs were significantly lower than in the neighboring BiH, where they fell from 
US$3.00 to US$1.70 per square meter after the project there, even though BiH’s labor costs are half Croatia’s. There is no valid 
data to make international cost comparisons based on area cleared, which is the relevant measure of demining costs. However, it 
is apparent that the starting prices both in BiH and Croatia, which were similar, were high because competition was in practice 
restricted to domestic companies. This changed in both countries over the course of project implementation. 
7. The PPAR (para. 3.5) for this project noted that the Bank paid careful attention to complaints, and concluded that they 
reflected” fractious competition among suppliers rather than corrupt practices.” 
8. ICR for works done and SAR for targets. 
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4.2 Technical assistance. All three studies: restructuring of Croatian railways, Master Plan 
for Rijeka Port, and road safety were successfully completed. Training was carried out for the 
pavement and bridge management systems. 
Results 
4.3 Road Condition. This is a key indicator of project outcome. At appraisal, it was 
estimated, based on a visual survey of the major and regional roads, that 34 percent of the roads 
surveyed were in good condition, 39 percent in fair condition, and 27 percent in poor condition.9 
No recent surveys are strictly comparable. The ICR reports that at project completion in 2001, of 
the 6,800 kilometers under HC’s responsibility, 45 percent were in good condition, 39 percent in 
fair condition, and about 16 percent in bad condition. If the pre- and post-project estimates were 
made on the same basis, this would mean a fairly significant improvement. However, the ICR 
assessment is limited to the country’s main roads, which normally are kept in better condition. 
More significantly, data obtained by the PPAR mission during discussions in Zagreb, indicate a 
cloudier and more negative picture: the percentage of roads in good condition would range 
between 18 and 30 percent, depending on the measurement criteria (Table 1). Either of these 
numbers would indicate deterioration rather than improvement in road condition. These numbers 
also are supported by a Bank report on Croatia’s transport sector.10  
4.4 It could be argued that, in some cases, just preventing further deterioration of the road 
network would be a satisfactory result. However, this reasoning does not apply to Croatia. The 
country had (i) the necessary financial resources, had it wished to allocate them, to properly 
maintain and significantly improve the network’s condition and (ii) highly qualified 
professionals who could plan and carry out the maintenance works as required. 
Table 1. Road Condition, 2002–03, According to Different Assessment Criteria 
 Good Fair Bad 
Based on measures of pavement roughness, rut, distress 18 36 46 
Based on pavement roughness and traffic levels 30 46 24 
Source: PPAR discussions with CR during field visit. 
 
4.5 Maintenance Funding. Provision of funds was erratic during the period, but overall it was 
substantially below $170 million per year, the level recommended at appraisal as necessary to 
catch up with the maintenance backlog. Inadequate funding is the main reason behind the 
unsatisfactory condition of the road network.  
4.6 Total expenditures in maintenance and highway reconstruction and rehabilitation (HRR) 
during 1995–97, the original plan period supported by the project, attained $278 million ($93 
million per year, on average). This was close to the appraisal figure, $293 million, considered the 
very minimum maintenance funding required during the period. However, expenditures fell 
again in subsequent years to an annual average of $78 million during 1998–2001. The figures for 
                                                 
9. Appraisal report. 
10. The Bank’s paper “Croatia: Policy Directions for Transport,” issued in June 1999, noted, “it is generally agreed that the main 
road network is presently in worse condition than it was at the beginning of the nineties.” Since funding for maintenance plus 
HRR did not improve afterward (see table in this chapter) there is no reason to believe that road conditions would have improved 
since 1999. 
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2002 and 2003 are substantially higher, but the 2002 figure has not been validated, and the figure 
2003 is a budget estimate. In the past, budget estimates have been notoriously unreliable. For 
example, an approved budget for maintenance plus HRR of $220 million in 200111 turned out to 
be only $67 million in reality. Dedicated funding of road expenditures based on gasoline tax 
surcharge started in mid-2001. This is likely to improve the resources available for road 
maintenance. A separate agency, Croatian Motorways (CM), with own funding also based on 
gasoline tax surcharge, is responsible for carrying out maintenance of the existing motorways 
and for future motorway development.  
Table 2. Road Expenditures, 1995-2003 (US$ million)  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 
2003 
budget 
Maintenance  30 59 75 80 57 39 66 127b 158 
Reconstruction, rehabilitation (HRR) 17 59 38 1 50 19 1 47 62 
TOTAL maintenance and 
rehabilitation 
47 118 113 81 107 58 67 171 220 
New constructiona 82 148 133 306 157 192 224 674 789 
TOTAL 129 266 246 387 264 250 291 848 1008 
Source: Appraisal documentation, Rijeka Gateway Project, May 9, 2003. 
a/ Includes motorway construction and upgrading of expressways to motorway standard. 
b/The PPAR mission was unable to verify this figure 
 
4.7 Allocation of Resources. Designed as a sector project, rather than a specific investment 
operation, the project sought government assurances that resources available for the road sector 
would be allocated on the basis of economic efficiency. Priority would be given to preserving 
existing road assets (which yield the highest economic returns) with some essential road 
construction mainly to complete missing links. However, the intended priority was not realized 
at any point during project implementation, with the more severe violations occurring in the later 
years of the project. During 1995–97, new construction attained $363 million, while maintenance 
plus HRR attained $272 million, or 75 percent of the construction amount. In contrast, the 
appraisal had estimated that resources for maintenance plus HRR would be almost double the 
amount devoted to construction. 
4.8 The launching of a massive motorway construction program in 1998 further tilted the 
allocation of road funding toward construction. During 1998–2002, construction amounted to 
$1.55 billion, more than three times the amount allocated for maintenance and HRR ($0.48 
billion). 
4.9 The diversion of resources away from maintenance and toward construction had two 
negative consequences. First, resources allocated to maintenance were insufficient. Second, the 
construction program was essentially for new motorways, which, maybe with the exception of 
short sections in the outskirts of the larger cities, did not have enough traffic (at least 15,000 
vehicles per day) to justify their high cost. The motorway program, when launched, was 
especially inefficient because some of the new investments were arranged in direct negotiations 
with a contractor, rather than through competitive bidding, leading to very high unit costs.  
                                                 
11. Reported in the Implementation Completion Report for the Highway Sector Project. 
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4.10 During PPAR discussions in Zagreb, senior government officials defended the motorway 
program as essential for Croatia to catch up with Western Europe, and to provide expeditious 
access to ports and tourist areas. As noted earlier, significant changes in transport demand 
patterns could have been expected given the prospects for restructuring and reorientation of the 
economy following independence. It was clear that the country needed to put in place a highway 
improvement and modernization program to meet the new demands. However, the PPAR finds 
that most of the motorway investments currently do not have an economic justification, and that 
the magnitude of the program is just too big for the country’s resources.12 A more cost-effective 
program could have been adopted limiting motorway construction to just those sections with 
high traffic, making more use of semi-motorways (2-lane, access-controlled roads) and 
expanding the capacity of other roads by more focused improvements. The semi-motorway 
Jankomir-Zapresic, visited by the PPAR mission, which carries over 10,000 vehicles per day, 
supports the validity of this concept. 
4.11 Pavement/Bridge Management System. The appraisal expectation that the PMS/BMS 
would be fully operational by 1997 was not met. As of mid-2003, according to PPAR 
discussions with HC officials, software has been installed, initial surveys have been carried out, 
and the system is being used in a limited way only, mainly to test strategic maintenance options 
for some of the main corridors.13 The expectations were not met in part because of 
implementation delays, and in part because the system, and the allocation of maintenance 
resources it should produce, have not been endorsed at high government levels. 
4.12 Rail, port, and road safety studies. These studies were useful. The railway study’s 
recommendations for restructuring are being implemented and expected to continue under the 
ongoing Railway Modernization and Restructuring Project. Similarly, the Master Plan for Rijeka 
port provided practical recommendations, and served as a basis for the preparation of the 
ongoing Rijeka Gateway project. The safety study produced recommendations that helped reduce 
traffic fatalities. 
Emergency Transport and Mine Clearing 
Output 
4.13 Clearing of Landmines. About 13 square kilometers were cleared, and about 1,500 
landmines and 3,200 pieces of unexploded ordinance were removed. Project-financed demining 
cleared 26 bridges (21 road and 5 railway), some 280 kilometers of state, county, and local roads 
and rights of way, and 150 kilometers of railway lines. Documentation reviewed by the PPAR 
mission, as well as discussions in the field, suggest that most of the mine clearing took place in 
or around transport infrastructure, and that the demining locations were identified from among 
affected infrastructure by officials from the transport and public works agencies. 
 
12. The Aide-Memoire of the February-March supervision mission identified some road construction that appeared to be highly 
uneconomic: the Sveti Rok tunnel, the motorway from Varazin to the Hungarian border, Breganza-Sisak Road, Zagreb-Gorican 
motorway (with traffic estimated to be 1,500–6,250 vehicles per day). 
13. The Aide-Memoire for the supervision mission in October 1999 was very clear regarding what should be expected from the 
PMS/BMS: In essence, it noted that the PMS should be considered implemented when routinely used in selecting roads and 
bridges for repair, allocate funds among competitive requirements, determine overall network needs, and justifying needs to 
government authorities and the public. 
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4.14 Transport. The mine clearing operations allowed the repair and reconstruction (R&R) of 
transport infrastructure to proceed. In some cases, the R&R work took place where infrastructure 
had been damaged by military action, although the area itself may not have been mined. In other 
cases, transport infrastructure may not have been damaged, and little or no reconstruction work 
was required, but mines had to be cleared to allow safe use of the infrastructure. Transport 
infrastructure repair or reconstruction work consisted of: (i) 180 kilometers of roads (130 
kilometers at appraisal) and 32 bridges (30 at appraisal); (ii) reconstruction of Lika and Novska-
Sisak railway lines, including 45 kilometers of track renewal and spare parts for locomotives. All 
the works and equipment foreseen at appraisal were carried out; and, (iii) in the ports, 
rehabilitation of piers, improvement of the roll-on/roll-off terminal, and delivery of handling 
equipment for Ploce Port was carried out as expected. The only item not carried out was the 
upgrading of the road access to Ploce port. 
Results 
4.15 The project was instrumental in reestablishing transport routes between Croatia and BiH. 
The fact that all 10 bridges connecting the two countries across the Sava and the Uma rivers are 
now operational has dramatically enhanced the possibilities for trade and movement of persons 
between the two countries. The reconstruction of the demolished bridge between Zupanja in 
Croatia and Orasje in BiH, on the European route M18 is especially important. Reestablishment 
of the cross-border linkages is of high benefit to BiH, because of its landlocked condition,14 and 
because transport overland through Croatia is practically the only way to connect BiH with 
Western and Central Europe. The reconstruction and improvement of Ploce port, BiH’s main 
maritime outlet, also is a major contributor to improving BiH logistical conditions (see Map) 
4.16 The project also improved important sections of Croatia’s domestic land transport 
system. Probably the more significant is the mine clearing and reconstruction of the Zagreb-Split 
(Western) rail line that goes solely through Croatia’s territory. While this line is longer than the 
parallel (Eastern) line running partially through BiH (the preferred line during the Yugoslav 
Republic), it is the only practical option for Croatia, while allowing it to fully control operations 
and avoid time-consuming border crossings. 
4.17 The project failed to improve road access to Ploce port. This investment, estimated at $1 
million at appraisal, was not a major component of the project, and road access is not a critical 
issue since Ploce traffic is still substantially below expectations due to the slow recovery of 
BiH’s economy and foreign trade. However, this road is indicative of the problems facing 
Croatia and BiH regarding investments where the main, or a major, beneficiary is BiH. A Ploce 
Agreement between Croatia and BiH15 stated, “the Republic of Croatia is required to maintain 
land transit routes (roads and rail) from the Port of Ploce to the point where it enters Federation 
territory.” Croatia, therefore, was not obligated to go beyond maintaining the existing land transit 
route. Revised engineering during project implementation raised the cost of the proposed 
improvement to about $15 million. While this better, but expensive, road improvement would 
have been more effective in reducing traffic congestion in the port area, the main beneficiaries 
would have been truckers carrying cargo to or from BiH. The issue of who bears the cost 
(normally the transit country) and who the benefits (normally the landlocked country) of 
 
14. While BiH has a small coastal section on the Adriatic at Neum, it has no port there, since it is near Ploce, which has better 
conditions for a port and had traditionally been the port serving Bosnia under the FSRY.  
15. Dated May 11, 1966. 
  
11 
 
                                                
investments to facilitate transit traffic is a recurrent issue in countries involved in transit 
arrangements. 
4.18 Unlike the earlier operation in BiH, this project did not intend to increase the level of 
awareness of the dangers of mines, probably because that activity was supported by other 
agencies.16 The focus of that activity is mainly urban areas with high population density, and 
villages, rather than transport routes or the areas around them. The PPAR mission visited some 
roads that had been improved under the highway project, where no mines were planted on the 
roadway itself. Yet, a CR staff member advised the evaluator not to walk in the hilly areas 
immediately outside the direct right-of-way, as they potentially could be mined areas. However, 
there were no signs warning of the potential danger, pointing to the need for CROMAC and/or 
the transport authorities to ensure that non-urban transport facilities are properly marked with 
clear warning signs when risks of mines are present. 
5. Ratings 
Outcome 
Highway Sector  
5.1 Outcome is rated unsatisfactory, mainly because project objectives lost much of their 
original relevance, which was to focus on rehabilitation and maintenance of the road network. 
Major deviations in resource allocation for the sector over the course of the project with respect 
to the intended focus results in a mixed assessment of the relevance of the sector program. The 
deviations were caused by the government launch of a large program of motorway construction 
without economic justification, in some cases with procurement methods that increased costs and 
further negated the justification of the investments. Regarding efficacy, physical outputs required 
to meet objectives were close to appraisal targets and all three studies were satisfactorily 
completed. The project had no targets regarding the condition of the road network. Yet, this 
should be an essential indicator, particularly in highway sector projects. However, the main 
objective of the project was  ‘modernization of the transport network, especially the main road 
network’, and an obvious implicit goal is the improvement of the whole road network. As noted 
earlier, despite investments under the road sector program, the most reliable measures suggest 
that overall road network condition was worse at the end of the project than at the start.   This 
indicates a low level of efficacy. Assessment of efficiency faces similar problems. The ICR 
estimates a return for the whole project to be about 45 percent, higher than the 40 percent 
estimated at appraisal. The high return is mainly due to the high yield of road maintenance and 
improvements.17 However, the ICR estimate is limited to Bank-financed investments (and a road 
co-financed by EBRD) and omits references to the large motorway investments carried out by 
the government in the last years of the project. While such investments were not part of the 
1995–97 road program supported by the project, they are an integral part of the road sector 
investments during the project period. As noted earlier, such investments were massive and, in 
 
16. Mainly the UNICEF and the International and the Croatian Red Cross.  
17. The ICR recalculated the ERR for a sample of 14 betterment contracts and found the ERR to range between 34 percent and 
98 percent. These estimates are credible, and result from higher traffic levels and lower unit costs than estimated at appraisal. The 
ICR also notes that the EBRD-financed Ostravnica-Delnice road had an ERR of about 20 percent.  
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fact, dwarfed the resources allocated to maintenance, and had low returns. Therefore, considering 
the sector as a whole, efficiency was low. 
Emergency Transport  
5.2 Outcome is rated satisfactory as the objective to repair and reconstruct surface transport 
and clear landmines was achieved. Relevance of demining affected infrastructure and improving 
key transport routes is high because these activities were essential for the physical and economic 
reconstruction of Croatia. Efficacy, to the extent of available targets, was high on the physical 
side, but activity at the port and the connecting railway has not yet reached the expected levels. 
Efficiency can be assessed by considering both the transport and the landmine clearing. On the 
former, while the project did not include economic analysis of the investments, the type of works 
carried out, spot repairs and reconstruction of infrastructure, normally have high returns. This is 
confirmed by a partial economic analysis provided in the ICR, which showed a weighted average 
ERR of 43 percent for 14 road rehabilitation sub-projects. On the latter, the decrease in the unit 
costs of demining is an indicator of improved efficiency. 
Institutional Development 
Highway Sector 
5.3 Institutional development is rated modest. The PMS/BMS system, the project’s most 
important institutional component, was not fully operational in 1997 as the SAR expected, nor 
was it fully operational by project completion. On the positive side, the government carried out a 
reform of the road sector organization and management, that included decentralization, and 
division of the road maintenance units into separate commercial companies, with joint ownership 
by the highway agency and the counties. This is a step in the right direction, but still leaves the 
governments (central and local) as owners of the maintenance companies. 
Emergency Transport 
5.4 Institutional development is rated substantial. As an emergency operation institutional 
development was not envisaged. Yet, introduction of competitive bidding required under the 
project for mine clearing activities (and later extended beyond the Bank project to all demining 
activities) and development of a local demining industry is a major achievement, and led to a 
substantial drop in the cost of mine clearing. While the Bank project financed only some 13.1 
square kilometers of demining (under 19 contracts with 10 companies or joint-ventures) the 
adoption of competitive bidding for all demining meant that while in 1998 there were 4 
companies registered in Croatia with 250 deminers, by 2001 there were 23 companies employing 
450 deminers. Bank staff during project supervision also helped set up CROMAC, the national 
agency in charge of implementing demining policy.18  
5.5 The transport side of the project helped develop cooperation between Croatia and BiH in 
infrastructure reconstruction, a cooperation that had not existed since the breakup of Yugoslavia. 
 
18. The supervision Aide-Memoire of January 15, 1997, asked for the establishment of an agency authorized to keep the central 
database, to prepare mine clearance maps, and to issue the quality control certificates for areas that had been cleared of mines.  
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Sustainability 
Highway Sector  
5.6 Sustainability is rated likely. The technical and economic sustainability of the road 
maintenance and improvement program is not in doubt. While maintenance finance has been 
erratic and generally insufficient in the past, the establishment in 2001 of dedicated funding, 
based on user charges, for the road system exclusive of the motorways, and the creation of an 
autonomous highway agency (CR) with assured funding, should make it possible to provide at 
least the minimum level required to prevent further deterioration. The motorway program has 
been reduced and, while the uneconomic investments already made cannot be reversed, the 
dedicated  funding for the motorway system (also established in 2001 and equally based on user 
charges) should provide enough revenues to attend to maintenance requirements. 
Emergency Transport  
5.7 Sustainability is rated likely. Clearance of mines has permanently freed key infrastructure 
for reconstruction and re-use. Maintenance of the roads improved under the project is likely to be 
conducted properly, based on the improvements in the funding for road maintenance discussed in 
the previous paragraph. On the railway side, most indicators of operational and financial 
performance under the ongoing railway project have been met, and structural reforms have 
proceeded at a faster change than originally anticipated.19 The railway appears well prepared to 
adjust to the changes in transport demand that have favored road traffic. The Zagreb-Split line, 
the repair of which was supported under the project, should remain an important part of Croatian 
Railways. The port of Ploce is the weak point in term of sustainability, since it still has 
substantially less traffic than had been hoped, and requires continuous subsidies for operations. 
Ploce being BiH’s maritime outlet, its traffic and financial situation should gradually improve as 
BiH’s economy picks up. 
 
Bank Performance 
5.8 Bank performance is satisfactory in both projects, as explained below. Yet, in both 
projects there were major delays between project appraisal and effectiveness. Few resources 
were allocated to supervision (slightly more than one mission per year), that severely limited 
provision of expertise on technical issues. On the other hand, strategic and economic supervision 
was strong, notably in the highway sector project, as discussed below. 
Highway Sector 
5.9 Bank performance is rated satisfactory. The supervision reports were clear about the 
issue of resource allocation and the inefficient diversion of funding toward motorway 
construction. On occasion, supervision ratings appeared to be too generous. For example, the 
supervision report of December 1997 rated Development Objectives as highly satisfactory while 
noting problems with implementation of the PMS/BMS and noting the probability that the 
maintenance backlog would increase even further. Also, despite the resource allocation issue and 
 
19. PSR dated October 8, 2003. 
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slow progress with the PMS/BMS, project development objectives and implementation progress 
were rated unsatisfactory in only one supervision report (April 1999). 
5.10 The borrower’s motorway program violated a financial covenant requiring investments 
over $5 million to show a rate of return over 12 percent (Section 4.04 of Loan Agreement). 
Rather than suspending the loan, Bank management decided to continue its implementation, but 
to press the case for economic efficiency. In addition to strong calls of attention on the issue by 
the supervision missions, the Bank prepared a sector paper that provided detailed analytical 
assessment and practical recommendations on the issue. The Bank also funded an advisor to help 
prepare the 2001–04 road program. Keeping the dialogue open, both through the project and the 
sector paper, may be credited with being an important factor in the government’s decision to 
downsize the motorway program to a more reasonable scale (although still containing 
uneconomic investments). The PPAR finds that the benefits to Croatia’s economy of this 
outcome justify the decision by Bank management not to suspend the loan. 
Emergency Transport 
5.11 Bank performance is rated satisfactory. The project was prepared at high speed and still 
achieved satisfactory quality. While it took a long time (nine months) for an emergency project  
from appraisal to loan approval, this was mainly due to a series of international agreements 
between Croatia and BiH that needed to be completed as condition of negotiations. Supervision 
missions, although relatively few for a project that faced significant institutional and 
implementation challenges in the mine clearing component especially, were good. The Bank was 
effective in insisting on the application of competitive bidding and in persuading authorities to 
make the necessary legislative changes, and in promoting the creation of CROMAC. On the 
negative side: (i) CROMAC report submitted to the PPAR mission notes problems at the start of 
project implementation due to “frequent replacement of World Bank personnel responsible for 
the project.”, and (ii) the Bank could have learned from the early implementation experience in 
BiH which showed little competition and high prices, to take a firmer stand in the Croatia project 
to ensure a competitive market there. 
Borrower Performance 
Highway Sector 
5.12 Borrower performance is rated unsatisfactory. The main factor in this rating is the 
misallocation of resources in the road sector, that is, the motorway program and the inadequate 
funding of maintenance. The motorway program appears to have been promoted by the Ministry 
of Reconstruction. As noted above, this program was in conflict with the Bank loan’s financial 
covenants. Inadequate funding for maintenance was a direct consequence of the increased 
funding for the motorway program. The Ministry of Finance and related central economic 
agencies could have exerted their leverage for more fiscally responsible investments, since, 
largely because of the motorway program, the government would be spending 5 percent of GDP 
(substantially more than most countries) in transport development.20 The highway agency, first 
 
20. As noted in the Bank paper “Policy Directions,” the government would be spending close to 5 percent of GDP in transport 
development, while a more focused and efficient program would only reach about 3 percent of GDP. This big program suggests 
that the “development” side of the government is prevailing over fiscally responsible policies that should concern the Ministry of 
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HC and then CR, performed well, sometimes excellently, in the physical implementation of the 
road maintenance and improvement investments. Technical quality of the works was good, as 
confirmed by field visits carried out by the PPAR mission. The decentralization of the road 
system and the move towards commercializing road maintenance were clearly good policies, as 
were the creation in 2001 of separate agencies for the main road network and for motorways, 
independently managed and funded. On the other hand, the HC and the CR did not appear 
interested in, or lacked the discipline for, establishing road condition measurements necessary to 
assess the condition of the network on a consistent basis over time.  
Emergency Transport  
5.13 Borrower performance is satisfactory. All agencies on the transport side and the mine 
clearing side of the project performed well. Implementation of the mine clearing posed the most 
potential problems. There were significant legal and administrative difficulties inherent with 
adopting competitive procurement for mine clearing, compounded by initial misunderstanding as 
to how procurement would be done. Yet, the borrower was able to take the necessary actions to 
reduce delays and to pass remedial legislation twice (1998 and 2000) to move away from 
restrictive procurement and contracting conditions. CROMAC, although a newly created agency, 
was rigorous in monitoring procurement, as evidenced by a detailed table of demining contracts 
provided to the PPAR mission.21 Initial coordination delays between transport and mine clearing, 
and low identification of transport infrastructure priorities for demining prevent giving the 
borrower the highest rating. 
6. Lessons 
6.1 The following lessons emerge from the two projects: 
¾ Highway ‘sector’ projects need to take a comprehensive view of the sector, and include 
appropriate, sector-wide performance indicators. One key indicator is the overall 
condition of the road network, since it is useful to judge the level of resources allocated 
for highway maintenance, the efficiency of road maintenance planning and operations, 
and the impact of road sector expenditures on the operating costs of road vehicles. 
Barring exceptional circumstances, overall road network condition should be expected to 
improve during project implementation. Such sector projects should take the necessary 
actions to ensure that the responsible highway agency has in place an adequate system to 
monitor road network condition. 
¾ Separation of agencies and funding sources for the maintenance and improvement of the 
national road network and for the construction of modern motorways, as Croatia did in 
2001, can be an effective way to ensure a stable level of funding for road maintenance. 
To ensure that resources are well utilized, especially for the modernization of the road 
system, there should be stringent rules for the allocation of the funds, including conduct 
of outsourced feasibility studies and transparent competitive procurement. 
 
Finance. Foreign investors are likely to be more concerned by the fiscal policies rather than by a fast-developing transport 
system. 
21. The Status of Projects table, divided into goods and works sub-tables, provided for each contract financed under the project, 
contract number, description, method of procurement, signing date, quantity (in square meters), contract value (in DEM), 
disbursed from World Bank, from government funds, undisbursed balance, and area actually cleared. 
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¾ Bank-financed projects by requiring competitive procurement and exemplifying its 
advantages can lead to the establishment of competitive procurement throughout a whole 
industry and to the development of qualified domestic contractors, as it happened with 
the demining industry in Croatia.  
¾ The need to improve transparency of its public procurement process is an important issue 
in Croatia’s public policy, in view of cases of non-competitive procurement in the 
motorway program and of complaints by unsuccessful bidders for demining contracts, 
both in the emergency transport project under review and the earlier Emergency 
Reconstruction project.22 
 
22. The PPAR of the Emergency Reconstruction project noted that complaints had been duly investigated and that they reflected 
“fractious competition rather than corrupt practices.” 
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Annex A. Basic Data Sheets  
Highway Sector Project (Loan 3869-CR) 
 
Key Project Data (amounts in US$ million) 
 Appraisal  
estimate 
Actual or  
current estimate 
Actual as % of  
appraisal 
estimate 
Total project costs a/ 567.8 1598.5 - 
Loan amount 80.0 80.0 - 
Cofinancing 47.5 40.9 - 
    
a/ While the project originally intended to finance a slice of the 1995-1997 road investment program, 
 it financed this and subsequent road programs until project closing in June 2001. 
 
Project Dates 
 Original Actual 
Initiating memorandum  July 7, 1992 
Appraisal  July 12, 1994 
Board approval  April 20, 1995 
Effectiveness April 27, 1995 July 26, 1995 
Closing date December 31, 2000 June 30, 2001 
 
Staff Inputs (US $ thousand) 
 Total 
Identification/Preparation 128.9 
Appraisal/Negotiations 124.5 
Supervision 344.6 
Completion 20.0 
Total 618.0 
 
 
Mission Data a/ 
 
 
Date  
(month/year) 
No. of  
persons 
Staff 
days in 
field 
Specializations 
represented 
Performance 
rating 
DO 
Performance 
Rating 
IP 
Identification/ Preparation 4/94 1  Ec   
Appraisal/Negotiations 10/94 4  Ec, Eg, Fa, Es   
Supervision  7/95-6/01      
 11/95    HS HS 
 7/96    S S 
 6/97    HS S 
 12/97    S S 
 7/98    S S 
 3/99    U U 
 10/99    S S 
 3/00    S S 
 11/00    S S 
Completion 7/01    S S 
       
Staff skills. Ec=economist, Eg=engineer, Fa=financial analyst, Ev=environmental specialist , Pr=procurement  
Specialist, Tr=transport specialist 
Performance ratings: DO=development objectives, IP=implementation progress 
a/ ICR data on staffing, number of missions and ratings is substantially incomplete and incorrect.  
Data shown here has been taken directly from PSRs.  
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Other Project Data 
Borrower/Executing Agency: 
FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONS 
Operation  Credit no. Amount  
(US$ million) 
Board date 
 
Rijeka Gateway Project 
47140/50/60/ 
P3910 
156.5 July 8, 2003 
    
 
 
Transport Emergency and Mine Clearing Project (Loan 4104-CR) 
Key Project Data (amounts in US$ million) 
 Appraisal  
estimate 
Actual or  
current estimate 
Actual as % of  
appraisal estimate 
Total project costs 122.3 131.2 - 
Loan amount 72.0 72.0 - 
Cofinancing 0 0 - 
Cancellation 0 0 - 
    
 
 
 
Project Dates 
 Original Actual 
Initiating memorandum  January 18, 1996 
Appraisal  February 1, 1996 
Board approval  November 21, 1996 
Effectiveness March 4, 1997 March 4, 1997 
Closing date June 30, 2000 December 31, 2001 
 
Staff Inputs (staff weeks) 
 Total 
Identification/Preparation 85.8 
Appraisal/Negotiations 203.0 
Supervision 434.1 
ICR 20.0 
Total 742.9 
 
Mission Data 
 Date  
(month/year) 
No. of  
persons 
*Specializations 
represented 
Performance 
rating 
DO 
Performance 
Rating 
IP 
Identification/ Preparation 1/96 2 Ec,Tr   
Appraisal/Negotiations 9/96 3 Ec,Fa,Tr   
Supervision  7/97 
5/98 
4/99 
11/99 
5/00 
11/00 
6/01 
10/01 
  S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
Completion  2/02 
6/02 
1 
1 
Ec 
Tr 
  
*Staff skills: Ec=economist, Tr=transport specialist, Fa=financial analyst 
 
